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Abstract
Pre-play face-to-face communication is known to facilitate coop-
eration. Various explanations exist for this eect, varying in their
dependence on the strategic content of the communication. Previous
studies have found similar communication eects regardless of whether
strategic communication is available. These results were so far taken
to support a social-preferences based explanation of the communica-
tion eects. The current experiment provides a replication and ex-
tension of previous results to show that dierent processes come into
play, depending on the communication protocol. Specically, pre-play
communication in an ultimatum game was either restricted to non-
game-related content or unrestricted. The results show that strategic,
but not social, communication aects responders' strategies. Thus,
the existing results are cast in a new light. I conclude that pre-play
communication eects may be mediated by qualitatively dierent pro-
cesses, depending on the social context.
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11 Introduction
Early experiments studying face-to-face bargaining have found high levels of
cooperation compared to those observed in anonymous bargaining. Face-to-
face communication was found to lead to close to 100% rates of agreement,
whereas substantial disagreement rates are commonly observed in experi-
ments which study anonymous bargaining behavior (Roth, 1995).1 Such
eects of communication on cooperation are not restricted to face-to-face
communication, but have also been found for written communication across
various games (e.g., Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006; Koukoumelis et al.,
2009, see Crawford, 1998 for a survey of experiments on communication).
In dictator games, where there are no eciency gains to be obtained from
cooperation, written communication still increase cooperation in the form of
more egalitarian outcomes (Andreoni and Rao, 2011; Mohlin and Johannes-
son, 2008). Nonetheless, face-to-face communication is typically associated
with stronger eects than those observed following written communication
(Brosig et al., 2003, 2004).
Several explanations have been suggested in the literature for the eects
of communication in general, and face-to-face communication in particular.
These explanations vary with dierent elements of the communication, specif-
ically the direction and content of the communication. In this paper, I focus
on the nature of the content of communication as a way to distinguish be-
tween qualitatively dierent eects of communication in the ultimatum game.
In order to disentangle possible underlying processes, the strategic content
of the communication is manipulated by excluding any game-related discus-
sion in one treatment, thus controlling for eects that depend on strategic
communication. In line with previous research by Roth (1995), restricted
and unrestricted discussions were found to have a similar eect on oers.
Conversely, the responders' strategies signicantly diered between the two
1Roth (1995) draws this conclusion based on the available literature in experimental
economics available at the time. The experiments that allowed face-to-face bargaining in at
least one treatment are Nydegger and Owen (1974), Homan and Spitzer (1982, 1986), and
Radner and Schotter (1989). The conclusion is further supported by more recent work on
bargaining (Bohnet and Frey, 1999a,b; Brosig et al., 2004). None of the experiments used
the structured ultimatum game studied by Roth (1995) and in the current experiment.
2communication treatments, with responders willing to accept lower oers
when communication was restricted. The responder behavior observed in
the experiment reveals that the similar proposer behavior under the dierent
communication protocols is driven by dierent processes. I conclude that
dierent processes can come into play in dierent situations. Thus, although
it is appealing to look for a unied explanation for the observed eects of
communication in dierent situations, it is likely that dierent studies tap
into dierent processes. In the following, I briey review possible explana-
tions for communication eects, before proceeding to motivate and describe
the current experiment.
Start by considering the eects implied by the elimination of anonymity
with face-to-face communication. First, once a player is identied, she has
incentives to cooperate at a personal cost in order to build her reputation
and reap the indirect benets of cooperation in future interactions. Second,
the elimination of anonymity implies identiability of the `other'. Schelling
(1968) suggested that \the more we know, the more we care." Indeed, various
experiments show that people become more generous towards others as they
gain personal information about them (Bohnet and Frey, 1999a,b; Charness
and Gneezy, 2008).2 Accordingly, social preferences may alter as a result
of increased empathy towards other players once they are observed.3 In
the domain of helping behavior and charitable giving, this eect has been
termed the `identiable victim' eect (e.g., Jenni and Loewenstein, 1997;
Kogut and Ritov, 2005a,b; Small and Loewenstein, 2003). Some evidence
on the eects of identiability in a dictator game was provided by Burnham
(2003), who manipulated identiability in a one-sided manner by showing
subjects pictures of their partners. Dictators were signicantly more likely
2These eects depend on cultural background (Buchan et al., 2006). Other studies
manipulated social distance without aecting the information about other players, with
mixed results (e.g., Bolton et al., 1998; Bolton and Zwick, 1995; Dufwenberg and Muren,
2006; Homan et al., 1996, 1999; Johannesson and Persson, 2000; Rigdon et al., 2009;
Small and Loewenstein, 2003).
3By social preferences I include any preferences over the payos or beliefs of other
players (e.g., Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Charness and Rabin, 2002; Fehr and Schmidt,
1999; Rabin, 1993). For example, the social context induced by the face-to-face commu-
nication may lead a player to prefer an outcome in which social welfare is maximized over
an outcome that maximizes her own monetary payo at a larger expense to others.
3to donate half of their endowment both when they saw a picture of the
recipient and when they themselves became identiable, suggesting that a
single process is not enough to explain the potential of communication. Other
experiments failed to nd a signicant eect of mere visual identication on
the tendency to give (Bohnet and Frey, 1999b; Greiner et al., ming), although
decisions were found to be idiosyncratically sensitive to the communication
(Greiner et al., ming).4 The conicting results can be reconciled through the
ndings of Kogut and Ritov (2005a,b), who showed that charitable giving
increases with identiability only for a single beneciary.
The eects of identiability discussed above exist regardless of any content
of communication, as illustrated by Burnham (2003). Allowing for strategic
game-relevant information to be exchanged as part of the communication
raises a new set of possible eects. When the game has multiple equilibria,
communication can facilitate coordination (e.g., Blume and Ortmann, 2007;
Charness, 2000; Clark et al., 2001). In the ultimatum game, The use of
threats by the responder can lead the players to play a Nash equilibrium
which is not subgame perfect.5 However, this does not explain the eects
of the content of communication on games with a unique equilibrium (e.g.,
Brosig et al., 2003; Charness and Dufwenberg, 2011; Dawes et al., 1977),6 and
specically in the non-strategic dictator game (Andreoni and Rao, 2011).
The content of the communication can alter the preferences of the play-
ers by modifying the social perception of the outcomes. One way in which
this can be achieved is through guilt aversion, by which players wish to avoid
`letting down' their partners (Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007; Charness and
Dufwenberg, 2006, 2011). Thus, a player who updates her belief about the
expectations of her partner following strategic communication now has a new
incentive to comply with the perceived expectations. Another motive iden-
4Visual identication also did not have an eect on contributions to a public good
(Brosig et al., 2003).
5Note that such equilibria in the strategy-method variant of the game to be described
below are not consistent with a responder's belief that attributes a positive probability
to the oer being lower than the equilibrium one. Indeed, this is the motivation be-
hind perfection renements (Selten, 1975). However, whether perfection renements are
normatively relevant is under controversy (e.g., Binmore, 1999).
6Introducing social preferences may result in new equilibria, see below.
4tied in the literature is a tendency to keep promises made as part of the
communication with a specic partner (Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2004;
Vanberg, 2008). When expecting responses from the recipient, communicat-
ing dictators in a dictator game generally promise to be, and consequently
are, generous (Andreoni and Rao, 2011). Strategic content can also make
social norms salient, in such a way that they cannot be ignored (cf. Konow,
2000; Rabin, 1994). Thus, preferences are altered without any new informa-
tion regarding the immediate partner. In line with this notion, Mohlin and
Johannesson (2008) found that messages from recipients increase generosity
in a dictator game compared to a no-communication baseline even if these
messages originated in a previous game with dierent players. Nonetheless,
the eect was stronger when the message came from the actual recipient
that the dictator was playing with.7 Additionally, Andreoni and Rao (2011)
found that receiving messages from recipients and writing messages as recip-
ients before the role allocation is announced had a similar eect on dictator's
donations.
Thus, the generous oers observed in the ultimatum game with pre-play
face-to-face communication can be explained by dierent underlying pro-
cesses. These processes diverge with regard to their dependency on the source
of the messages (self, partner, third-party) and on the strategic content of
the messages. The current paper aims to add to the understanding of the
eects of pre-play communication by testing the eects of free communica-
tion versus communication that is restricted to non-strategic content. In
the context of social dilemmas, Dawes et al. (1977) have previously studied
the role of the strategic content of face-to-face communication by restricting
communication in one treatment to non-game related content, to nd no sig-
nicant dierences due to communication restriction. A similar approach was
applied to the ultimatum game by Roth (1995). The experiment included
three experimental treatments. In the control treatment (henceforth NO-
COM), subjects played an ultimatum game using the standard protocol. i.e.
the players did not communicate with each other and remained anonymous.
7However, only the dierence between the donations in the baseline and the within-
game communication treatments was statistically signicant.
5In the unrestricted communication treatment (henceforth UNR-COM), the
two players could communicate for two minutes before playing the game.
In the restricted communication treatment (henceforth RES-COM) the sub-
jects similarly communicated before playing the game, but were not allowed
to refer to the experiment itself during the face-to-face communication phase.
The results showed a signicant decrease in ultimatum rejections (33%
in NO-COM, 4% and 6% in UNR-COM and RES-COM, respectively) and
an increase in mean oers ($4.27 out of a pie of $10 in NO-COM, $4.85 and
$4.70 in UNR-COM and RES-COM, respectively). The increase in mean of-
fers corresponded to the higher rates of equal split oers in UNR-COM, (75%
compared to 31% in NO-COM and 39% in RES-COM). When oers around
the equal split ($4.50-$5.50) were examined, high rates were observed in both
communication treatments (83% and 82% in UNR-COM and RES-COM re-
spectively, 50% in NO-COM). Focusing at the time on disentangling changes
in social utility due to communcation from coordination through strategic
communication, Roth (1995) concluded that \the results cast doubts on the
[strategic] communication hypothesis" (p. 298).
However, these results are not enough to reject the explanations that
depend on the strategic content of the communication, as their predictions are
fullled in the experimental data, even though they are not able to explain the
results in RES-COM. In other words, all of the explanations delineated above
predict that communication leads to more egalitarian oers by proposers.
As they do not generate contradicting positive predictions, no results can be
conclusive in terms of disentangling them.
Conversely, the responder behavior in the ultimatum game provides a
better test for the processes associated with the strategic content of the com-
munication. Eects of identiability suggest that exposure triggers caring
for the payos of others. Accordingly, responders should be less likely to
hurt the proposers (as well as themselves) by rejecting oers. On the other
hand, if the strategic content of the communication activates the egalitarian
social norms, responders should be more likely to conform to these norms,
as proposers do, i.e., reject low oers.8
8This is true for both the interpretation of social norms as focal points, which can be
6It is important to note that the disagreement frequencies reported by
Roth (1995) do not reect the responders' strategies in a reliable way, as
the responders are acting on vastly dierent oers in the dierent treat-
ments. Since the proposers make generous oers in the two communication
treatments, the likelihood to observe disagreement in actual play drops sub-
stantially regardless of the underlying strategy.
In the current experiment I use the strategy method (Selten, 1967) in
order to elicit the full strategy vector of the responders.9 In other words,
the responders choose whether to accept or reject each possible oer with-
out knowing the actual oer made by the proposer. Although this turns the
game into a simultaneous-moves games, the same treatment eects are to
be expected as in the standard extensive-form game (Brandts and Charness,
2000, 2011).10 Thus, this experiment provides clean data with regard to the
inuence of pre-play face-to-face communication on the strategic behavior of
players in the ultimatum game. If changes in social preferences due to identi-
ability indeed fully explain the results of Roth (1995), then the acceptance
threshold in the two communication treatments should be similar, and equal
to or lower than that in the control treatment. Conversely, if the proposer
behavior in UNR-COM is driven by strategic communication, then the ac-
ceptance threshold in this treatment is predicted to be signicantly higher
than in the other treatments. The experimental data supports this interpre-
tation of the previous ndings. The remainder of the paper is organized as
follows. The next section describes the experimental design and procedure.
Section 3 discusses the experimental results, and section 4 concludes.
supported in equilibrium (Bohnet and Frey, 1999b; Schelling, 1960) and or as aecting
preferences through considerations of self-image (Andreoni and Rao, 2011; Bodner and
Prelec, 2003; Dana et al., 2007). Guilt aversion has no clear prediction, as the strategy of
the responder has no eects on payos in equilibrium.
9This paper is a replication and expansion of the preliminary results reported in
Schmidt and Zultan (2005). The new data allows for statistically signicant results to
be obtained, with somewhat altered conclusions and additionally investigates the eects
of communication on the beliefs of the players.
10A meta analysis by Oosterbeek et al. (2004) shows that oers and demands are
higher under a restricted strategy method, where responders provide an explicit accep-
tance threshold.
72 Experimental design and procedure
To provide control over the communication between subjects in the exper-
iment, the experiment was conducted at the video laboratory of the Max
Planck Institute for Economics in Jena. Sessions were conducted in March
2009 and 2010.
One hundred and twenty eight subjects played the ultimatum game with
strategy method. In the game a pie of p = 90 ECU is to be allocated
between the two players.11 The proposer X chooses an oer x in multiples
of 5 ECU, under the restriction that each player receives at least 5 ECU.
Therefore 17 dierent oers are possible. Simultaneously, the responder Y
indicates for each of the 17 possible oers whether she accepts or rejects it.
I denote the response to a possible oer x by yx 2 faccept;rejectg. If the
responder receives the actual oer made by the proposer, the players receive
their payos accordingly. Conversely, if the responder chooses to reject the
oer made by the proposer, both players receive a payo of zero. Thus, the




p   x if yx = accept
0 if yx = reject;




x if yx = accept
0 if yx = reject:
I dene the individual acceptance threshold y

to be the smallest amount that




The experiment includes three treatments, corresponding to the three
11ECU stands for experimental currency units, which were converted into money at the
end of the experiment at a conversion rate of 10 ECU = 1 Euro).
12Out of 64 subjects, 55 chose a monotonic strategy vector in all four periods (i.e.,
if yx = 1, then yx0 = 1 for all x0 > x). Three subjects rejected high oers as well as
low oers in all four periods (cf. Bahry and Wilson, 2006; G uth et al., 2003; Hennig-
Schmidt et al., 2008; Huck, 1999). Four subjects deviated from monotonicity in only one
decision point across the four periods, probably due to a typing error. One subject chose
a monotonic strategy vector in one periods, and rejected high as well as low oers in the
8treatments of Roth (1995), in which the communication is conducted via
video interface. To eliminate interactions between subject gender and com-
munication treatment, only females were invited to participate in the exper-
iment (Eckel and Grossman, 2001).
Four proposers and four responders participated in each experimental
session. When showing up for the experiment, each subject was shown a
list of the invited subjects and was asked whether she recognized any of
the names on the list. A subject whose name was recognized by a subject
who was in the other role received a 4 Euros show-up fee and was released.
In order to guarantee that the proposers and the responders do not meet
each other outside the experimental communication duration, the proposers
and responders were invited in two cohorts, separated by 15 minutes. The
proposers were led into the lab before any of the responders showed up,
and were placed in insulated cabins. Each cabin includes, in addition to a
computer terminal, a camera, a screen, a microphone, and a speaker. Once
the responders arrived the experiment commenced.
First the subjects received the instructions for the communication phase
and for the game.13 The instructions were (known to be) identical for all
subjects in a given session. Four rounds of ultimatum game with pre-play
communication were played throughout the session, so that each proposer
played exactly once with each responder and vice versa. Each round included
a communication phase and a game phase. In the communication phase each
proposer was connected via video interface to the responder whom she was
matched with in this round, so that the two players could see each other on
screen and hear each other through the speaker. The subjects were then able
to converse for a period of two minutes, after which the cabins were discon-
nected.14 In RES-COM, the experimenters monitored the conversation to
check that the subjects do not discuss the game. In the control treatment,
other three periods, one of which includes one rejection point in the acceptance range.
Only one subject chose seemingly arbitrary strategy vectors (in 3 of 4 periods), and was
subsequently excluded from the analysis. This exclusion does not qualitatively alter the
results.
13Translation of the German instructions is provided in the appendix.
14Unfortunately, due to technical problems only one session of UNR-COM and two
sessions of RES-COM were taped, thus precluding analysis of the communication content.
9the subjects had to wait for two minutes with no communication before the
game phase commenced. Subjects in RES-COM typically discussed their
eld of studies and experiences as students. As expected, subjects in UNR-
RES discussed possible allocations in the game, usually followed by some
personal chat as in RES-COM. Following the communication phase, the sub-
jects were asked to make a decision on screen. The proposers were asked
to choose a division of the 90 ECU. The responders were presented with all
17 possible divisions on screen sequentially in random order, and they were
asked to indicate for each one whether they accept or reject it. Once all 17
decisions were made, the responders were shown their decisions, and had the
chance to make changes before making a nal conrmation. No feedback re-
garding decisions and payos was provided until the end of the experiment.
At the end of the last round, the subjects were asked about their beliefs
regarding their partners in this round.15 The responders were asked to guess
the division chosen by the proposer whom they interacted with in the fourth
round, while the proposers were asked to guess the smallest amount that
the responder whom they interacted with in the fourth round was willing
to accept. For a correct guess a subject received an additional 5 ECU. The
nal payo in the experiment was the payo for one randomly chosen round
(which was the same for all subjects in any given session), in addition to any
payos for correct guesses in the fourth round, and a show-up fee of 4 Euros.
Following the end of the last round, each subject was presented with the fol-
lowing information: the randomly chosen payo round, the division chosen
by the proposer in this round and the responder's corresponding decision,
the subject's guess and whether it was correct, and the sum of ECU accu-
mulated throughout the experiment. Next each subject who participated in
one of the two communication treatments was shown a screenshot of the four
subjects in the other role, and she was asked to rate each one of them on six
scales corresponding to the semantic dierential (Osgood et al., 1957), and
to indicate whether she knew any of the subjects.16 These ratings did not
15Beliefs were elicited only after the nal round to avoid an eect of the belief elicitation
procedure on behavior.
16The options were do not know, have seen before, and know personally.
10yield any interesting result, and are not discussed further.
Finally, the subjects were informed of their nal payo in the experiment.
First the proposers were paid and released. Next the responders were paid
and asked to wait for an additional 10 minutes before being released. In
total, 128 subjects The sessions lasted approximately 75 minutes from the
arrival of the proposers until the release of the responders (approximately 60
minutes for each cohort). The average earnings were 8.06 Euros for proposers
and 7.82 Euros for responders. All earnings include a show-up fee of 4 Euros.
3 Experimental results
In the two communication treatments, subjects who are playing in the same
role and in the same session communicate in dierent rounds with the same
subjects who are playing in the opposite role. Despite the fact that the
subjects never directly interact with each other and receive no feedback about
game decisions throughout the experiment, this indirect communication may
yet create dependencies in decisions.17 To account for this issue, I report
in the following non-paramteric tests conducted both on the session and
on the individual levels.18 The non-parametric tests are complemented and
supported by regressions that allow for the error terms to be correlated within
the sessions.
Although oers in the control treatment were lower than those observed
by Roth (1995, p. 297), the eects in the proposers' Data are qualitatively
replicated; generally, communication induces higher oers and a higher rate
of near-equal oers, leading to lower disagreement frequencies (although re-
jection rates are not lower in the rst period. See Table 1).19 Average oers
do not dier between UNR-COM and RES-COM (pSES = :313;pIND = :579,
17Note that this problem is absent in treatment NO-COM, and is mitigated in treatment
RES-COM, where no game-related information is passed between the communicators.
18With ve independent observations in NO-COM and UNR-COM and six indepen-
dent observations in RES-COM, each comprised of four proposers and four responders.
Signicance levels are denoted by pSES and pIND when based on session and individuals,
respectively.
19The rejection rates are presented in Table 1 for consistency with the presentation of
Roth (1995).
11Mann-Whitney test), although a slightly higher proportion of equal-split of-
fers is observed in UNR-COM compared to RES-COM.20 Recall that Roth
(1995) interpreted these results as support for the social preferences basis of
communication eects.
Table 1: Proposer behavior
Treatment  x=pa N Prop. of
x = 45
Prop. of





.365 20 .09 .49 .18
(.114)
UNR-COM
.472 20 .66 .84 .06
(.051)
RES-COM




.378 20 .15 .55 .20
(.124)
UNR-COM
.475 20 .45 .90 .30
(.061)
RES-COM
.449 24 .54 .83 .21
(.116)
a Standard deviations (based on N subjects) in parentheses.
Although the proposers' behavior replicates, by and large, that observed
by Roth (1995), a dierent pattern emerges once the responders' strategy
vectors obtained by using the strategy method are examined. Even though
similar oers are observed in the two treatments, as in Roth (1995), responder
strategies observed in the new data show that responders behave signicantly
less cooperatively in UNR-COM compared to NO-COM as well as RES-
COM. This analysis focuses on the acceptance threshold y

extracted from
the full acceptance vectors. Following Roth's (1995) analysis of oers, I look
20This dierence is signicant if the dependencies between oers made by the same
proposer are ignored (p = :033, Fisher's Exact test) and when the means of individuals
are compared (pIND = :018, Mann-Whitney test), but not when the session means are
compared (pSES = :268, Mann-Whitney test).
12at the share of equal-split and near-equal-split acceptance thresholds.
Table 2: Responder behavior
Treatment  y















.206 20 .03 .06 .10
(.125)
UNR-COM
.322 19 .24 .47 .28
(.153)
RES-COM




.222 20 .00 .10 .20
(.131)
UNR-COM
.295 19 .16 .37 .26
(.160)
RES-COM
.243 24 .04 .12 .24
(.151)
a Standard deviations (based on N subjects) in parentheses.
Table 2 summarizes the results pertaining to the acceptance thresholds.
The mean acceptance threshold is signicantly higher in UNR-COM than
in both other treatments (pSES = :020;pIND = :035, Kruskal-Wallis test);
whereas the mean acceptance threshold is not signicantly higher in RES-
COM compared to in the baseline (pSES = :580;pIND = :528, Mann-Whitney
test), in contrast to the results obtained in the preliminary study reported in
Schmidt and Zultan (2005). The same result is reected in the higher pro-
portions of equal-split thresholds in UNR-COM compared to NO-COM and
RES-Com (pSES = :051;pIND < :001 and pSES = :102;pIND < :001, respectively,
Mann-Whitney test.
Finally, the proportion of Nash equilibrium play under money-maximization
(i.e. the acceptance threshold equals the oer) is higher in UNR-COM, when
the players are able to explicitly coordinate on an equilibrium, than in NO-
COM and RES-COM (pSES = :070;pIND = :005 and pSES = :023;pIND = :000,
13respectively, Mann-Whitney test) In 17 of 21 (.81, 95% CI [.64-.98]) Nash
equilibrium plays in UNR-COM, players coordinated on the equal split equi-
librium. Conversely, equal-split equilibrium play occurred only 3 times in
RES-COM and never in NO-COM.
The results in the rst period are in the same direction as overall, but are
weaker and noisier, and thus do not reach signicance. The lack of statistical
signicance cannot be explained merely by the loss of power compared to the
analysis based on subject means (which eliminate some of the within-subject
variance) as the eects are pronounced and signicant in the fourth period.
The mean relative threshold in UNR-COM is signicantly higher than in NO-
COM in period 4 (.33 vs. .19, pSES = :012;pIND = :008, Mann-Whitney test)
as well as than that in RES-COM (.33 vs. .23, pSES = :005;pIND = :054). The
dierence between NO-COM and RES-COM is not signicant (pIND = :429).
Therefore some adaptation is taking place, as some responders in NO-COM
become more accepting between the rst and the last periods (pIND = :077,
Wilcoxon signed ranks test) while some responders in UNR-COM become
more demanding (pSES = :042;pIND = :016). Since responders in NO-COM
receive no feedback and do not engage in communication throughout the
experiment, this adaptation can not be attributed to learning due to new
information, but is more likely to be due to reection (Iyengar and Schotter,
2008; Weber, 2003). The stronger pattern apparent in UNR-COM, however,
suggests that there might be a cumulative eect of communication, for ex-
ample, if one proposer has an eect on her responder partners that last for
future periods (although it's easier to imagine that this has the opposite
eect i.e., an eect of an aggressive bargainer rather than of a generous bar-
gainer). Therefore I conduct an additional test, comparing the rst-period
thresholds in UNR-RES to the fourth-period thresholds in NO-COM. Since
the time trend in NO-COM is not associated with any new information, this
can be taken as an alternative test for the treatment eect. This test shows
a signicant dierence (pIND = :030, Mann-Whitney test).21
21One may argue that reection leads to subgame-perfect equilibrium play (Weber,
2003), hence this test reects the time trend more than the treatment eect. Recall,
however, that the opposite trend is apparent in UNR-RES.
14Table 3: Linear and probit regressions of oers and acceptance thresholds by
treatment and period
Oer







Intercept .351*** .017 -1.741*** .220 -.126 .181
UNR-COM .119*** .027 2.432*** .423 1.018 .618
RES-COM .091*** .022 1.647*** .347 .894*** .241
Periodc -.009* .004 -.227* .109 -.063 .048
UNR-COM x .008 .006 .404*** .142 -.000 .133
Periodc
RES-COM x .008 .004 .165 .127 .033 .057
Periodc
N 256 256 256
Acceptance threshold
Share of the piea y










Intercept .193*** .033 -1.701*** .270 -1.913*** .336
UNR-COM .146*** .039 1.136*** .332 2.045*** .384
RES-COM .039 .034 .237 .416 .762 .423
Periodc -.009 .007 .206*** .021 -.221 .139
UNR-COM x .020* .009 -.102 .070 .355* .156
Periodc
RES-COM x .005 .007 -.090 .130 .221 .139
Periodc
N 252 252 252
a Linear regression with robust standard errors clustered on sessions.
b Probit regression with robust standard errors clustered on sessions.
c Last period as baseline.
*,**,*** Signicant on the p < :05, p < :01, and p < :005 level, respectively.









Intercept .203*** .020 .436*** .019
UNR-COM .172*** .048 .035 .021
RES-COM .103*** .031 .043 .021
N 64 63
a Robust standard errors clustered on sessions.
*** Signicant on the p < :005 level.
These results are further supported by the linear and probit regressions
reported in Table 3. Most importantly, the mean oer is signicantly higher
in both UNR-COM and RES-COM when compared to NO-COM, whereas the
combination of coecients reveals no signicant dierence between the two
communication treatments ( = :029;RSE = :026;p = :285). Furthermore,
the two communication treatments do not exhibit a decline in oers over the
four periods as in NO-COM. In contrast, the acceptance threshold in UNR-
COM is signicantly higher than in NO-COM, but no signicant dierence is
observed between RES-COM and NO-COM. The combination of coecients
further reveals that the responders are more demanding under unrestricted
compared to restricted communication ( = :108;RSE = :021;p < :001).
Table 4 presents linear regressions conducted on the beliefs collected in the
fourth period. The responders are generally optimistic, with expected oers
in NO-COM almost as high as in the communication treatments. As the
actual oers in this treatment are rather low, only 10.0% of the expectations
are correct, compared to 52.6% and 45.8% in UNR-COM and RES-COM,
respectively (2(2) = 8:583, p < :05).
Somewhat incongruous with the actual behavior, demands expected by
proposers in RES-COM are, on average, 10.3% higher in NO-COM. However,
expectations are 6.9% lower than in UNR-COM), and less accurate (only
3 of 24 [12.5%] correct in RES-COM vs. 7 of 20 [35.0%] in UNR-COM,
162(1) = 3:145, p < :10). This surprising result suggests that proposers
do not expect responders to become more cooperative following face-to-face
communication, as implied by the social preferences hypothesis. Apparently,
proposers who are observed feel to be more accountable to their partners and
expect them to be more demanding as a result.
4 Conclusion
The experimental results provide strong support for the hypothesis that dif-
ferent processes are at play in the dierent communication treatments, and
thus call into question the previous interpretation of communication eects
in ultimatum bargaining. The experiment reported by Roth (1995), applying
play method, could not uncover responders' strategies, as the observed dis-
agreement rate was driven primarily by proposers' oers. Treatment compar-
isons of the responders' decisions were not indicative of responders' strategies,
as the responders in separate treatments were faced with dierent decision
tasks. Thus, the study of responder behavior can serve to reveal dierences
in behavior, thereby also illuminating the observed proposer behavior.
In the current study, the use of the strategy method enabled compar-
isons of responders' strategies in an informative way. The similar behavior
observed by Roth (1995) under unrestricted and restricted pre-play commu-
nication is now shown to reect dierent processes, as responders' strategies
are notably sensitive to the (restriction of) strategic content of the commu-
nication.22 When strategic communication is allowed, responders become
signicantly more demanding compared to lack of communication or even
social communication. This reects a strategic eect of coordination on the
egalitarian social norm, as can be seen by the relatively high proportion of
plays that achieved coordination in UNR-COM.23 The social norm can be
interpreted as a Schelling (1960) focal point, in which case the high demands
22The generality of this conclusion may be restricted to the female population from
which the subjects were sampled.
23Restricted communication lead to a lower-than-baseline mean acceptance threshold in
Schmidt and Zultan (2005), suggesting an eect of identiability. This dierence was not
replicated with the larger sample employed in the current experiment.
17are part of a Nash equilibrium, or as a result of an intrinsic preference for
complying with the social norms, which has previously been assumed for
allocator decisions (Andreoni and Rao, 2011; Konow, 2000). The existence
of similar eects in dictator games favors the latter interpretation. Con-
versely, when communication is restricted, no signicant eect is observed for
the responders' behavior (and coordination on a Nash equilibrium is almost
never achieved). Thus, dierent processes are at play when the communi-
cation lacks strategic content. In this case, the results are in line with an
identiability-based process, as proposers become more generous when social
distance to the responders is reduced.
To conclude, the results of this experiment suggest that pre-play commu-
nication eects may be the outcome of strategic and social-aective processes,
as well as an interaction of both, depending on the protocol of the com-
munication. Game-free social communication induces cooperative behavior
through other-regarding preferences, while game-relevant strategic commu-
nication aects the way in which the players consider social norms. The
inuence of the protocol may come about by means of inducing a dierent
framing for the interaction. When players make a decision following a bar-
gaining discussion, they become more sensitive to the strategic structure of
the interaction, whereas when the decision making follows a social interac-
tion, the players become more sensitive to social cues. Although strategic
communication may also increase the salience of social norms, this eect is
mediated by the strategic- dependent dynamic of the communication.
This paper adds to the vast literature on behavior in ultimatum bargain-
ing. I focus on the recipient behavior, which has received relatively little
attention in previous studies, when compared to proposer behavior, possibly
because \The Recipients' action[s],...are easier to interpret" (Thaler, 1988,
p. 197).24 The existing studies stress the importance of fairness and adher-
ence to social norms as a motivation for rejections. When the responders
have incomplete information regarding the size of the pie, and hence regard-
ing the size of a `fair' oer, they are considerably less likely to reject an oer
24Out of 75 results of the standard ultimatum game included in the meta-analysis by
Oosterbeek et al. (2004), only 12 used the strategy method to collect responders' strategies.
18that is potentially fair (G uth and Huck, 1997; Mitzkewitz and Nagel, 1993).
Huck (1999) has convincingly showed that responders reject oers that are
perceived as unequivocally unfair, even if they are willing to accept lower
oers that are potentially fair. The current study suggests that strategic
communication exacerbate this adherence to social norms, by that increas-
ing the cost that responders are willing to bear for not deviating from what
they perceive to be fair. An interesting extension to this line of research
would be to combine the design used in G uth and Huck (1997) with dierent
protocols of communication.
The conclusions drawn here suggest that future study and application of
pre-play communication should allow for dierent types of communication
eects, and take into account the social context in which the communication
takes place. Dierent social contexts apparently play a crucial role in deter-
mining the direction and amplitude of the eects of communication on social
decision making.
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25Appendix: Experimental instructions
General instructions
Please read the following instructions carefully. The instructions are iden-
tical to all participants. The experiment consists of 4 rounds. In the exper-
iment you can earn money. How much money you earn depends on your
decisions and the decisions of the other participants. All money amounts
will be stated in ECU (Experimental Currency Unit). 10 ECU equal to 1 e.
Eight participants participate in the experiment. The four participants
in cabins 1-4 decide as type X. The other participants in cabins 5-8 decide
as Y. The number of your cabin is on the cabin door. In each round one X
interacts with one Y. During the following four rounds you do not interact
with any participant twice.
At the end of the experiment, one of the four rounds will be randomly
chosen for the calculation of your payo. The amount you earn in this round
will be calculated in e and paid in cash together with the 4e showup fee.
Participants X and Y will receive their money separately and will be shown
out of the building separately. Since the X- and Y-participants have already
been shown into the laboratory at separate times, you do not meet the par-
ticipants of the other type at any time point.
Treatment UNR-COM
At the beginning of each round you have the possibility to commu-
nicate with the participant of the other type that you are matched with
for 2 minutes by video conference. During this time the two partic-
ipants can see as well as hear each other, and are free to talk about
anything.
Treatment RES-COM
At the beginning of each round you have the possibility to commu-
nicate with the participant of the other type that you are matched with
for 2 minutes by video conference. During this time the two partici-
pants can see as well as hear each other. They are, however, not allowed
26to talk about the experiment. This will be controlled by us. In case
anyone does not comply, they will not be paid.
Only female participants are participating in the experiment.
You will receive a separate page, which describes the exact procedure in
a round.
27Round instructions
Each X/Y pair interacts via the computer per the following rules:
In each round, X proposes how a pie of 90 ECU should be divided between
him and Y. X enters on-screen the share of Y (i.e. the remainder of the pie
remains for X).
Y is not informed of this oer. Y states for all possible oers, whether
he accepts or rejects. I.e. for X=85 and Y=5,..., X=5 and Y=85. These
allocations will be presented in random order. At the end it is also possible
to review and revise them.
The payo is determined by comparing the oer of X with the corre-
sponding decision of Y. If Y accepts, then X and Y receive each the amount
proposed to him by X. If Y rejects, then both participants receive nothing.
Therefore each decision of Y may be relevant to the payo.
Control questions
With the three following questions we check that you have understood the
rules. Please answer the questions as best you can. Before the beginning of
the experiment, we will check that you have answered the questions correctly.
1. Imagine that X has oered Y 15 ECU, and that his oer was accepted.
How much will X and Y earn?
X earns ECU Y earns ECU
2. Imagine that X has oered Y 70 ECU, and that his oer was rejected.
How much will X and Y earn?
X earns ECU Y earns ECU
3. Imagine that X has oered Y 5 ECU, and that his oer was accepted.
How much will X and Y earn?
Y earns ECU X earns ECU
28